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TRANSITION FROM OPEN ACCESS TO QUOTA BASED 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT REGIMES IN ALASKA INCREASED 
THE SAFETY OF OPERATIONS 
STEVEN E. HUGHES1 , CHRISTOPHER WOODLEY 2 
ABSTRACT 
During the past 12 years fishery managers responsible for federal fisheries off 
Alaska have developed and implemented three new fishery management limited 
access/quota share programs in place of traditional open access management. The three 
limited access programs are unique but each provides for the allocation of quota shares 
to individual participants in the halibut and sablefish longline fishery, in the Bering Sea 
pollock trawl fishery and in the Bering Sea king and Tanner crab fishery, respectively. 
New management programs are briefly described and contrasted with traditional 
management. For each of the three fisheries, management changes over time have 
generated substantial changes in fishing fleets, their operations, crew employment, 
economics and safety records. Under quota share management, fleet consolidations have 
occurred, particularly in the more over capitalized fisheries. The intense speed and 
inflexible timing associated with open access fisheries have greatly lessened as have the 
risk taking and incentives to maximize fishing power. Active vessel economic viability 
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has strengthened due to a combination of increased efficiency, higher product yields, 
reduced costs, greater crew stability and safer operations. 
 
Keywords: Alaska fishery management, transition, open access management, 
limited access/quota share based management, commercial fishing impacts 
INTRODUCTION 
Fishery managers responsible for the federal fisheries off Alaska are steadily 
changing fishery management regimes from open access/Olympic style fisheries to 
individual fishing quota (IFQ) or to industry sector/quota share/co-op programs. Three 
of the ten major fisheries in the region, the Pacific halibut and sablefish longline fishery 
in 1995, the trawl pollock fishery in 1999-2000 and the notoriously dangerous king and 
Tanner crab fishery in 2005, have each adopted unique measures that allow for quota-
based type management of these significant fishery resources. The North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council (NPFMC) is continuing to develop quota based management 
programs for other federal fisheries off Alaska, as are other regulatory authorities 
around the world. 
Fishery management regimes and implementing regulations are powerful tools that 
directly impact fishing fleets, vessel operations, industry economics, employment and 
safety. This document identifies and addresses operational, economic and employment 
changes that have occurred in three Alaska fishing fleets impacted by management 
regime change, and it sets the stage for subsequent comparative analysis of safety 
records before and after those management changes occurred. Effects of management 
changes on the three described fleets in Alaska are provided to benefit others 
considering future changes in management regimes and the likely regulatory impact of 
IFQ type programs. 
METHODS 
For each of the three diverse fisheries, the open access and subsequent quota share 
management regimes are described. Fleet composition, operations, economic viability 
and crew are next described by fishery with changes over time as a result of transition 
from open access to quota share management. 
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The majority of information documenting trends in fleet composition, seasonal and 
operational modes, and crew employment is drawn from a recent report by Hughes and 
Goodman (2006) which was compiled from several sources of data plus practical 
knowledge of the fisheries. Data were based on a variety of Federal and State of Alaska 
reports including publications from; Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), 
Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC), International Pacific Halibut 
Commission (IPHC), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the NPFMC. 
While fleet size and season duration are well documented, crew employment 
information stems from a combination of actual data and practical knowledge of the 
fisheries. 
ALASKA HALIBUT AND SABLEFISH INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTA  
The Alaska halibut fishery has been fully developed and operational in the Gulf of 
Alaska, Aleutian Islands and in the Bering Sea since the late 1800s. The sablefish 
fishery has since developed over the same region from the mid 1900s. Both fisheries are 
conducted exclusively by longline gear operated by what we now characterize as small- 
to mid-sized vessels in the 25-80 foot range. Prior to 1995, these fisheries were 
managed by the setting of annual harvest quotas, season opening dates, in-season 
harvest monitoring and closure of fishing at a date of projected quota achievement. 
Access to fisheries was basically open to any vessel that obtained the required license. 
In 1994, the final year of the “open access fishery,” both halibut and sablefish 
fisheries had become extremely overcapitalized with participating vessels and crews. 
The 1994 halibut fleet numbered 3,450 unique vessels and the 1994 sablefish fleet 
numbered 1,191 unique vessels. Fishing had progressively shortened to less than one 
week per year for halibut and less than two weeks per year for sablefish. Employment 
was commensurately short-term in terms of days and stretched to the maximum hours 
per day. Fishing operations were intense “derby style” and conducted in any weather 
conditions that occurred during the short season openings. 
Alaska’s halibut and sablefish “Individual Fishing Quota” (IFQ) program was 
developed by the NPFMC during a five to six year period prior to implementation in 
1995 (58 FR 59375). Vessel owners were allocated “quota shares” based on 
documented catches during qualifying history years. Each year, 1995 to date, specified 
pounds of halibut and sablefish are allocated to quota share holders for their exclusive 
use based upon their quota share (their percentage of the total annual quota) and the 
current year total allocation for the directed halibut and sablefish fisheries. 
The Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ program has been in place for 12 years. 
Substantial changes have occurred. These fisheries now extend over approximately a ten 
month period rather than one to two weeks. Quota share ownership has consolidated 
substantially. The operational halibut fleet has been reduced from 3,450 unique vessels 
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in 1994, to 1,279 unique vessels in 2005, while harvest quotas have remained quite 
stable (Exhibit 1). Similarly, the sablefish fleet has been reduced from 1,191 unique 
vessels in 1994, to 378 unique vessels in 2005 with little change in annual quota. 
Operations have changed in many ways. Although individual vessels actively fish a 
greater number of days each season under quota share management compared with open 
access management, vessel operators can choose when to fish during the longer fishing 
season maximizing safe weather and sea conditions and optimizing price and market 
opportunities. Longer seasons and more fishing days provide employment opportunities 
for full-time professional crews who are well trained and operate the vessels and gear 
safely and efficiently. Under derby fishing management, some vessels would set more 
longline gear than they could haul during the short open period allowing them to 
abandon gear with low catch rates causing waste of the fishery resource and loss of 
gear. Under quota share management, the quality and value of the harvested halibut and 
sablefish is maximized increasing overall profitability. A dedicated longline fleet of 
more efficient and professionally operated vessels has again become prominent. 
Professional longline crews have gained opportunities for long term employment 
and a strong level of income from combinations of halibut and sablefish fisheries. 
Halibut and sablefish, but especially halibut landings are now spread over the year and 
sold largely as fresh steaks and portions to a large domestic market. Fish quality is up 
and processing costs are down, both to the consumer’s advantage.   
Between 1989–1994, vessel losses and fatalities associated with the halibut fishery 
were fairly commonplace. During this six year time frame, there were 33 vessel losses 
and 14 fatalities (USCG 2006) (Exhibit 2). Historically, this safety record has been 
interpreted as being the logical result of the “derby” style prosecution of the halibut 
fishery, which combined factors of smaller vessels operating in poor weather conditions 
and crews working without rest during the short duration, intense fisheries. Improving 
the fleet’s safety record was a primary goal of the halibut and sablefish IFQ program. 
Following the change from open access to IFQ based management, vessel loss and 
fatality data declined during the subsequent six years, with 27 vessels lost and 11 
fatalities during the 1995-2005, suggesting an improvement, (USCG 2006). 
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Exhibit 1. Comparative history of the Alaska halibut fishery before and after 
rationalization, 1990-2004. 
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Exhibit 2. Comparative safety record in terms of vessel loss and fatalities in Alaska 
halibut and sablefish fisheries before and after rationalization, 1989-2005.   
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Surveys of Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ holders from 1997 to 1998 indicated 
that 85% of those surveyed felt “IFQ’s have made fishing for halibut safer (Knapp 
1999). While the overall decrease in number of vessel losses and fatalities is a positive 
indicator, a thorough analysis of rates of vessel loss and fatalities in the fisheries, 
adjusted for seasonal variations in employment and fishery effort, is needed to 
confidently state whether vessel loss and fatality rates have declined. Currently the 
National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety is conducting such an assessment, 
with final results expected in March 2007. 
BERING SEA POLLOCK SECTOR ALLOCATIONS AND QUOTA SHARES 
The modern day Bering Sea pollock fishery off Alaska is the largest volume fishery 
in the U.S. with annual landings of approximately 1.4 million metric tons (mt) in recent 
years. This is a large boat midwater trawl fishery, described by three separate industry 
sectors--the factory trawler sector, the mothership/catcher boat sector and the inshore 
processor/catcher boat sector. After the Bering Sea pollock fishery was fully developed 
and somewhat over developed by U.S. interests, a moratorium on new entrants into the 
fishery became effective in 1996 (60 FR 40763). Management through 1998-1999 
remained by the setting of annual harvest quotas, sector allocations, season opening 
dates, in-season harvest monitoring and closure of fishing to sectors when sector 
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allocations were reached. In late 1998, management was changed to quota share 
management by federal legislation commonly known as the American Fisheries Act 
(AFA) (AFA 1999). This Act was implemented in 1999-2000 and remains in place 
today. 
 
In 1998, the Bering Sea fleets numbered 29 factory trawlers, three motherships and 
100 catcher trawlers. These fleets operated about 100 days per year, in split winter and 
late summer/fall seasons. During the 1990s, season durations were becoming shorter 
with harvesting and processing upgrades within existing fleets as operations became 
intensely competitive between the three fleet sectors and between vessels and plants 
within sectors. The fishery was becoming more “derby style” and basically all 
operations were geared to maximize revenue per day during the open seasons rather 
than revenue per fish. Processing operations both at-sea aboard factory trawlers and 
motherships and inshore at shore plants and floating processors followed the same 
pattern in their production of pollock fillets, surimi and pollock roe. 
 
By direct federal legislation and by directions to the NPFMC, the AFA substantially 
changed management of the Bering Sea pollock fishery beginning in 1999 and 2000. 
Annual pollock allocations to vessel owners are based on quota shares (a percentage 
of the total annual quota established from catch history years) and the current year 
pollock allocation established for the fishery as a whole and for each sector. Season 
dates remain part of the management and each vessel basically operates within those 
seasons with the exclusive right to harvest their allocated pollock on a schedule that best 
fits their overall operations, weather conditions and their markets. 
  
The AFA has now been fully in force for seven years. The greatest changes to the 
fishery occurred during the first year of the AFA management. More gradual changes 
have continued to a point of major stability. The fleet of 29 factory trawlers was reduced 
to 20 factory trawlers by law, and further reduced to 16 operating factory trawlers by 
industry consolidation of quota shares within and between companies (Exhibit 3). The 
three motherships and the inshore processing facilities have all remained intact and 
operational. The fleet of catcher trawlers has been reduced by about 15 percent from 
100 vessels in 1998 to a current fleet of 86 vessels. 
Catcher vessel reductions have occurred largely by the stacking of pollock quota 
shares on the larger and more efficient vessels and by retiring some smaller and less 
efficient vessels. 
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Exhibit 3. Comparative history of the Bering Sea factory trawler pollock fishery 
before and after rationalization, 1995-2004.   
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Employment has become much more stable with greater certainty of incomes for 
processing workers, fishermen and owners of vessels and plants. Both plants and 
vessels are better maintained, upgrades are financed with increased revenues and people 
are better trained and working longer in highly desired positions throughout the fishery.  
With the notable exception of the capsizing of the FV Aleutian Enterprise in 1991 
with a loss of nine crew members, all sectors of the Bering Sea pollock fishery have 
been free of vessel loss and operational fatalities (USCG 2006). As such, it is difficult to 
determine whether changes in fishery management from open access to the AFA 
cooperatives have improved safety. Individual interviews with vessel operators indicate 
that the fishery is safer because it can be prosecuted at a more deliberate pace and there 
is greater economic stability. One area where an assessment could be made is to 
determine whether the number of serious injuries occurring within the fleet (particularly 
the catcher processor and mother ship sectors) have declined since the implementation 
of the AFA. Currently the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety is 
conducting such an assessment, with final results expected in March 2007. 
BERING SEA CRAB HARVESTING AND PROCESSING QUOTA SHARES 
The Bristol Bay red king crab fishery and the opilio Tanner crab fishery, both 
occurring in the eastern Bering Sea off Alaska, have been fully developed fisheries 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s, respectively. The crab fleet is comprised by mid-
sized vessels that average about 115 feet in length and are typically crewed by a crew of 
five. Both fisheries are conducted with steel-framed pots measuring about seven feet 
square by 30 inches high and weighing 780 pounds. Until March 2005, Bering Sea crab 
fisheries were managed largely as “open access” fisheries with some restrictions on new 
entrants imposed during the 1990s, long after these fisheries were heavily 
overcapitalized by both harvesting and processing capacities. Management was 
conducted by the setting of annual harvest quotas for legal sized male crab, setting a 
season start date, monitoring in-season harvests, and closing the season at a date of 
projected quota achievement. Over the last 25 years, Bering Sea crab stocks have been 
subject to substantial variations in biomass and large fluctuations in annual harvest 
quotas.  
During the 2004-2005 season which marked the end of the traditional management 
of Bering Sea crab fisheries, the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery was conducted by 243 
catcher boats and eight catcher processors. The season opening duration was only four 
days. The opilio Tanner crab fishery in January of 2005 was conducted by 168 catcher 
vessels and six catcher processors and the season duration was five days. These fisheries 
had grown into a classic “derby style” operation with each vessel and crew operating at 
maximum capacity for the short duration season in an attempt to harvest as much crab 
as possible in competition with every other vessel in the fleet. Employment was very 
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short term. Revenues for the crew were subject to a share of the catch. Revenues for the 
vessel owners were also based on catch volume and value and subject to a great deal of 
annual variation depending on short-term performance in an intense fishery.  
The Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program was developed by the NPFMC 
during a five to six year period and implemented in March 2005 (70 FR 10174). This 
new management program has only been in place for one season spanning the 2005-
2006 Bristol Bay red king crab fishery and the 2005-2006 opilio Tanner crab season.  
The first season of Bristol Bay red king crab and opilio Tanner crab fisheries under 
the Bering Sea Crab Rationalization Program saw the operational crab fleet reduced to 
about 85 vessels from the prior years 251 vessels for red king crab and reduced to about 
90 vessels from 174 vessels in the opilio Tanner crab fishery. 
Vessel crew employment changes followed suit. There was a reduction of several 
hundred crew jobs. Jobs were eliminated for those younger crew members with short-
term experience in favor of crew with long-term relationships with vessel owners, 
particularly crew having been skippers and holding skipper quota shares that could be 
fished along with the vessel’s crab quota shares. 
The Bering Sea crab fisheries have the well-deserved reputation as being one of the 
most dangerous occupations in the United States. From 1991-2005, 26 vessels sank and 
77 fatalities occurred in these fisheries (USCG 2006). Broken down along casualty 
types, the two major fatality groupings have been due to capsizing events and man 
overboard events. Forty-nine lives have been lost in ten capsizing events and nineteen 
crew members have died as a result of man overboard events (Exhibit 4). 
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Exhibit 4. Comparative safety record in terms of fatalities by type in Bering Sea & 
Aleutian Islands crab fisheries before and after rationalization, 1991-2005.   
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
0
5
-0
6
Capsizing Man Overboard Industrial Flooding 
1st Year of
Rationalization
Safety
Program
Began
 
 
Over half of these capsizing events occurred during the first twenty-four hours prior 
to the start of the season, when the vessels were fully loaded with pots and transiting to 
the fishery grounds. Many of these capsizing incidents were directly the result of 
masters loading more pots than the vessel could safely carry as a way to maximize 
catching power in the derby style fishery (Woodley 2000). Contributing factors to these 
incidents often included crews operating without sleep for days at a time, vessels 
operating in extremely poor weather and in icing conditions, which could quickly 
compromise vessel stability. A major disruption to Bering Sea crab fatality trend 
occurred in 1999 when the Coast Guard began an aggressive safety campaign to address 
vessel stability and overloading concerns (Woodley 1999). This safety initiative focused 
upon enforcing loading practices as required by the vessel’s stability books and keeping 
overloaded vessels from departing port.   
One of the main goals of the Bering Sea crab “three pie” rationalization system was 
to improve fleet safety. It is the hope of fishery managers and safety agencies such as 
the Coast Guard that crab rationalization allow operators to place less emphasis on 
catching power, and will result in better operational decision making (e.g. not operating 
in poor weather and not operating without rest). Additionally there is hope that 
rationalization will result in only the most capable vessels remaining in the fishery 
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while less efficient vessels retire. The first year of crab rationalization has been 
promising, with no lost vessels, no fatalities and a reduced number of injuries. However, 
there has not been a sufficient passage of time to determine whether crab rationalization 
has lived up to its promise. Further study on the safety benefits of crab rationalization is 
needed.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the new limited access quota-based management programs implemented to 
manage the halibut/sablefish longline fishery, the Bering Sea pollock fishery and the 
Bering Sea crab fishery have been effective in addressing management problems 
inherent in traditional open access fisheries management. Details of the three 
management programs are different but each program limits entry to qualified 
operators/permit holders, establishes quota shares based on past participation and 
documented catch histories, allocates annual harvest quotas to quota share holders based 
on their percentage of total allowable catch and provides for procedures to buy/sell/lease 
owned quota shares or annual harvest quotas. We summarize the key points as: 
- Limited access/quota share management stops the “race for fish.” 
- Operations benefit from improved certainty that planned fisheries will be 
achieved, less time wasted, higher efficiency, lower costs and more stable 
employment of crews 
- Numbers of employed crew in overcapitalized fisheries will be reduced, 
leaving remaining crew with dedicated long-term careers in fisheries and 
improved opportunities for longer fishing seasons and increased incomes. 
- Limited access/quota share management promotes vessel safety by eliminating 
the need to be competitive in bad weather conditions that would compromise 
vessel stability and crew safety. 
- Changes in fishery management from open access limited access/quota share 
programs, have significant potential to promote vessel safety. However these 
improvements are not automatically guaranteed. A significant and continued 
commitment on the part of the owner and the operator are necessary to ensure 
that other economic factors do not override the obligation for providing a safe 
workplace. 
- Changes in fishery management practices can significantly enhance economic 
viability, thus allowing owners to provide well-maintained vessels and 
professionally trained crews. 
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- Operationally, limited access/quota share programs also have significant 
potential to promote vessel safety by allowing the master to err on the side of 
safety by avoiding bad weather, fishing at a slower pace (allowing for 
increased crew member rest) and not overloading the vessel. 
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